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THE HUMAN TORCH-AN EXEGESIS
ABOUT THE CLOTHES WE WEAR
I. INTRODUCTION
I wish to apoligize to my reader for not following the usual aloof,
esoteric and sententious style which is most often employed in legal
writing. Indeed, I gladly plead guilty to employing a genre which is
often thought better suited to sensational fiction. But is not a guilty
plea justified? Take the case of Philip,' aged four. This lad had been
dressed in cotton trousers which "ignited and burst into violent flames
while [he] was standing near a fire. . . . [That] Philip suffered severe
burns which resulted in a permanent physical injury" 2 is a mere under-
statement. Therefore, the court, in addition to granting recovery, held
that the "trousers were inherently dangerous'" because they burned
like a torch.
Just imagine this four-year old. Hear his cries. Smell his burning
flesh and singed hair. View his atrocious scars. See his face racked with
pain and think of the numerous operations and months in the hospital.
Sickening isn't it? Yes, especially when this tragedy could have been
readily averted by effective legislation. However, since no legislation
was in effect to protect Philip, he was forced to seek redress in the
courts. This opens the door to consumer protection, flammable fabrics,
implied warranties, products liability, negligence, and a host of other
concepts-all unnecessarily complicated and often quite baffling. So,
perhaps fny guilty plea, if not entirely justified, is at least based on
sound law and human compassion. Hopefully, Mr. Reader, you will
be incensed at the inadequacy of the law in the area of flammable
fabrics. Furthermore, it is hoped you will support any and all efforts
to ensure that effective legislation is enacted to protect us all.
II. HISTORICAL AND MEDICAL BACKGROUND
One of the earlier authors to write about this type of tragedy was
Plutarch. In the biography of Alexander, Plutarch tells the story of the
1. Knab v. Alden's Irving Park, Inc., 49 II1. App. 2d 371, 199 N.E.2d 815 (1964).
2. Id. at 373, 199 N.E.2d at 817.
3. Id. at 380, 199 N.E.2d at 820.
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ugly faced Stephanus who willingly subjected himself to an experiment
with naptha.
[A]s soon as he was anointed and rubbed with it, his whole body
broke out into such a flame, and was so seized by the fire, that
Alexander was in the greatest perplexity and alarm for him, and
not without reason; for nothing could have prevented his being
consumed by it, if by good chance there had not been people at
hand with a great many vessels of water for the service of the bath.
with all which they had much ado to extinguish the fire; and his
body was so burned all over, that he was not cured of it a good
while after.4
The Bible also speaks of human burning and sacrifice. Abraham
was instructed by God to offer his only son, Isaac, as a burnt offering.
Abraham proceeded as directed by God. But as Abraham was about
to slay Isaac prior to firing the kindling, God intervened in Isaac's
behalf by placing a ram in the thicket. Then at God's direction Abra-
ham offered the ram instead of his son.'
Unfortunately, most potential burn victims have little hope of
divine intervention and no statutory protection. So, with no protective
shields operating in his favor, the victim gets burned. What is a burn?
"A burn is a bodily injury or lesion caused by contact with, or exposure
to, heat, caustic chemicals, electricity, or radiation."' Burns are classi-
fied by degree. First-degree burns, e.g. sunburn, are the least severe.
They show a reddening (erythema) and slight swelling (edema). Sec-
ond-degree burns involve skin blistering and some swelling. A distinc-
tion is made between superficial and deep second-degree burns. The
primary distinction is that a superficial second-degree burn destroys the
epidermis and the upper layers of the dermis, whereas a deep second-
degree burn destroys all but the deepest layers of the dermis. These
burns, often moist with weeping, uncover nerve endings and are very
painful. Third-degree burns are those where the epidermis and the en-
tire dermis are destroyed. They appear either brown or dead white (the
color of subcutaneous fat). Since hair follicles, sweat glands and nerve
endings are destroyed, they are usually less painful than second-degree
4. PLUTARCH (C. 100 A.D.), LivEs 265 (The Cuneo Press, Inc., 1936).
5. Genesis 22.
6. IA L. J. GORDY & R.N. GRAY, ArORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE r 20.01
(1965).
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burns. Fourth-degree burns are those where tissue beneath the skin,
such as fat, muscle and bone has been destroyed. Lastly, a char burn
destroys one complete area of the body.
7
Treatment of burns is painful, slow, and dangerous because the
victim is so susceptable to infection. Furthermore, dehydration presents
a serious problem. Children and the aged present special problems.
Both have difficulty weathering the initial stress. Children have diffi-
culty coping with the physiological concomitants of a serious burn and
the aged often have little desire to recuperate. The methods of treat-
ment are constantly being improved due to dedicated personnel within
the medical community, but the underlying fact is that a great percen-
tage of these tragedies could be prevented were there effective legisla-
tion to require clothing manufacturers to fireproof all articles. As will
be seen, judicial law can only provide a monetary "cure".
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FLAMMABLE FABRICS
The factual accounts of many of the most horrible burn cases are
barely believable. In Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc.,8 the attractive plain-
tiff purchased an evening gown with a double-netted skirt. Unknown
to her, the netting had been sized with pyroxylin-a nitrocellulose
material which is the chemical basis of gunpowder. When the "dress
. . . came in contact with a lighted cigarette, [it] exploded and was
consumed in a blinding flash of fire . . ."I Taking the basic premise
that "[c]lothing is worn to cover, adorn and protect the human
body," 10 one cannot help but wonder why a manufacturer of dresses
would size them with pyroxylin. But one's imagination is staggered
when one learns that a manufacturer of welding aprons treated them
7. Id. at V 20.21. One of the best works concerning burns is: C.P. ARTZ & E. REISS,
THE TREATMENT OF BURNS, W.B. Saunders Co., Philadelphia, 1957. Cf. Larson and
Gaston, Current Trends in the Care of Burned Patients, 67 AM. J. NURSING 319 (1967)
and Swartz, Product Liability: The Torch Cases, 76 CASE & COMMENT 3 (1971). The
last article cited contains an excellent account of a burn victim's life from a psychological
viewpoint. Perhaps the best summary of the victim's plight was stated by Mr. Swartz
when he said: "The severely burned will live forever in a hell not of his own making."
Id. at9.
8. 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (944), affd, 60 N.E.2d 839 (1945). Cf. Dayton v. Harlene
Frocks, Inc., 86 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1948), affd, 86 N.E.2d 176 (1949).
9. Moss v. Fred Perlbrg, Inc., 29 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923 (1941). The language quoted
here equally applies to the first case cited in note 8, supra.
10. Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 49 N.Y.S.2d 461,463 (1944).
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with pyroxylin. Such was the case in Ingalls v. Meissner" where the
plaintiff employer recovered from the defendant apron material seller
for monies paid to the plaintiff's disabled employee who was injured
by the defendant's apron.
The courts have generally had difficulty in pinpointing the exact
legal theory which they wished to employ to justify recovery for the
non-negligent plaintiff. Perhaps one of the better statements was made
in Deffebach v. Lansburgh & Bro., 2 where the plaintiff's chenille loung-
ing robe caught fire as she waved a match after lighting a cigarette.
The court, after interpreting the District of Columbia Code and deter-
mining that the plaintiff relied on the seller's judgment stated:
Since outer garments intended for domestic wear are not unlikely
to come into momentary contact with lighted matches, tobacco,
or stoves, it seems to us clear that a robe which, when this contact
occurs, instantly bursts into flame and inflicts severe injury is
unreasonably dangerous and unfit for use."3
A Washington state court cited Deffebach with approval when another
plaintiff was burned by a summer cocktail robe. After citing the afore-
mentioned excerpt, it continued that "it might be expected that a
lounging robe or cocktail robe would be subjected to flame and heat
hazards that come from cigarette lighting and smoking ... "" Both
Deffebach and the summer cocktail robe case were based on an implied
warranty, however, many of the earlier cases were based solely on
negligence. In Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.,15 the plaintiff's
attorney sought to use negligence and an implied warranty as a basis
of recovery for the estate of a seven-year old who died about three
months after his "Gene Autry" suit caught fire. However, the three
year Statute of Limitations had run, so the plaintiff attempted to re-
covery on the theory of nuisance. Unfortunately this theory failed to
bring the plaintiff recovery.
There are four legal theories which can be employed by the plain-
tiff in an attempt to recovery for flammable clothing injuries. Today,
If. I I Wis.2d 371, 105 N.W.2d 748 (1960).
12. 150 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 772 (1945).
13. Id.
14. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, _.....-, 239 P.2d 848, 851 (1952).
15. 95 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1950), affd, I10 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1952), affd, I I! N.E.2d 421
(1953).
[Vol. 23
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the implied warranty in the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-315
and 2-318 is a very powerful tool. It behooves the plaintiff to employ
it. Negligence actions still have their place, but it is extremely difficult
for a plaintiff to prove how the defendant was negligent and then how
this allegedly negligent act was causal in injuring the plaintiff. On the
other hand, under the concept of implied warranty one need only prove
that the goods were unfit for their designed purpose. An even more
powerful tool is contained in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965). More will be mentioned about this theory later
in this article."6 Lastly, if none of the other theories can be employed,
one might try nuisance. However one's prospects of recovery are very
poor, because nuisance suits have been historically limited to facts
based on land use interference.
A. The Implied Warranty
An implied warranty has been described as "a freak hybrid born
of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract." 7 Actually it wasn't born,
it was haphazardly created.
South Carolina is unique because it recognized not only caveat
venditor, instead of the typical caveat emptor, but also implied warran-
ties as early as 1793.18 However, prior to the 1968 adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code, a "warranty of a chattel [did] not run
with the property but, [was] personal to the purchaser to whom the
warranty [was] made...
The Commonwealth countries early recognized the implied war-
ranty. In Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd.,2 the plaintiff re-
covered from the defendant because he contacted dermatitis from free
16. See Part III, Sec. D., infra at 796.
17. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
18. Timrod v. Shoolbred, I Bay 324 (S.C. 1793). Here the plaintiff purchased a
slave ploughman from the defendant. One day after the sale was consummated, the slave
broke out with smallpox and died. The court, in granting recovery to the plaintiff said:
"[Selling for a sound price, raises, in law, a warranty of the soundness of the thing sold;
. . . this warranty extends to all faults, known and unknown to the seller..."
19. Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 326, 95 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1956).
20. [19361 A.C. 85. ,
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sulphite left in his "Golden Fleece" woolen underwear. The Privy
Council said:
[T]he buyer [is entitled] to the benefit of an implied condition that
the goods are reasonably fit for the purpose for which the goods
are supplied, but only if that purpose is made known to the seller
"so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judg-
ment."
21
Most jurisdictions, however, failed to recognize the implied war-
ranty. In denying the plaintiff recovery for acute dermatitis from dye
in a cotton dress, a Pennsylvania court in a 1941 case said: "It can
hardly be said that a vendor thereof would be liable for a breach of an
implied warranty solely because of the harmful effect due to a buyers
individual idiosyncrasy."" Such a statement generally encompasses the
pre-Code public policy.
In a later Washington case, the dissenting judge said: "The oldest
and most extensively used fabric known to man is cotton. Men have
burned themselves with it from time immemorial and probably always
will. . .. 13 [Furthermore since the r]espondent failed to prove what
21. Id. at 99.
22. Barrett v. S.S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Sup. 516, ......_, 19 A.2d 502, 503 (1941).
23. According to unpublished material supplied to the author by Mr. Robert L.
Innes, Administrator of the Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children, Galveston, Texas,
the Judge's statement is accurate. 72.7% of all fabrics which burned and caused injuries
were 100% cotton. 7.1% were a cotton blend and 12.4% were made of various synthetics.
As far as the frequency of specific garments which ignited involving boys' clothing:
30.4% were shirts, 24.6% trousers, 10.0% undershorts, 9.2% undershirts and T-shirts,
6.2% socks, 4.6% tennis shoes, 6.2% pajamas or robes, and 8.8% miscellaneous. As to
girls' clothing: 27.9% dresses, 21.5% nightgowns, pajamas or robes, 2.9% skirts, 8.6%
blouses, 6.8% slips, 18.3% panties, and 14.0% miscellaneous.
Of the admitted cases, 49.9% involved 0-30% of the total body surface burned, 33.9%
involved 30-60% total body surface, and 16.2% involved +60% total body surface. (For
an explanation on how to determine the extent of injury by the "Rule of Nines," see IA
L. J. GORDY & R.N. GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE €" 20.22 (1965)).
Although the greatest frequency of acute admissions from clothing ignition at the
Shriners Burns Institute is for children between 5 and 6 years old, the greatest death rate
is for children 2 to 3 years old. It should be noted that this hospital has been in existence
since 1966 and it only treats acutely burned children up to the age of 16. Sources of
ignition were heaters and fire places (28.0%), matches (23.8%), outdoor fire (21.3%),
other (8.4%), kitchen range (7.3%), hot water heater (5.9%) and unknown (5.3%).
Dr. Ptjlip R. Lee, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, for the Flammable Fabrics Act and Product
Safety Commission testified to a House Committee (90th Cong., Ist Sess., Serial No.
90-2 (1967) at 57) that theie are approximately 150,000 burn cases per year involving
[Vol. 23
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caused the explosion, . . . recovery must be [denied under the theory
of implied warranty.]" 2 Fortunately, the minor plaintiff, whose shirt
caught fire, prevailed under the theory of implied warranty. But state-
ments similar to those of the dissenting judge are not atypical in the
decisions which immediately preceeded the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code's version of implied warranty.
The case of Knab v. Alden's Irving Park, Inc.,2 5 demonstrates a
typical court's reaction to implied warranties while the Uniform Com-
mercial Code was under consideration in the state's legislature. Al-
though the Code was not yet law, the court felt justified in finding a
common law implied warranty.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina also took a similar ap-
proach to the Code in Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co.,
26
but the law of implied warranty did not reach its maturity until S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-315 and 10.2-318 went into effect on January 1,
1968. In particular, § 10.2-318 is an extremely powerful section be-
cause it extends an implied warranty "to any natural person" whose
"person or property is damaged." Thus, with this enactment, the Leg-
islature codified and expanded a 130 year South Carolina precedent
that "a retailer . . . 'is bound . . . to make good the damages which
the buyers shall have suffered.' ",
B. Contributory Negligence-No Defense to an Implied Warranty
The jurisdictions are fairly evenly split as to whether or not contri-
butory negligence is a defense to an implied warranty. One of the better
clothing ignition. Burn victims occupy 2 million hospital bed-days per year and approxi-
mately 3,000 victims die as a result of their injuries. One of the more tragic aspects of
these clothing burns is that the victims are most often children, the aged, the disabled
and the poor.
Later estimates are that the 1967 statistics of Dr. Lee are still accurate. Wallace,
Fabric Fires Continuing To Cause Anguish, Agony, The State (Columbia, S.C.), July
25, 1971, at 8-A, col. I.
24. Martin v. J.C. Penney Co., 50 Wash.2d 560, 565, 313 P.2d 689, 693 (1957)
(dissent).
25. 49 111. App.2d 37t, 199 N.E.2d 815 (1964). See text at note 1, supra.
26. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
27. Smith v. Regina Mfg. Corp., 396 F.2d 826, 828 (4th Cir. 1968). Further infor-
mation on implied warranties may be found in Ray, Products Liability-A Symposium,
19 S.W.L.J. I et seq. (1965), and McNeal, Flammable Fabrics, Detergents, Farm Machi-
nery and Equipment, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 450 (1963).
1971] NOTES
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cases was brought by a disenchanted plaintiff whose cattle failed to
gain weight as normally expected when they were fed food manufac-
tured by the defendant. The plaintiff pleaded that the defendant's cattle
food did not meet certain standards, so he sought recovery under an
implied warranty. The defendant answered and pleaded contributory
negligence because the plaintiff allegedly failed to follow the package
directions. The court, in rejecting the defense and summarily dismissing
the case, said:
[Tihis Court [Texas] ...does not recognize . . . general ...
contributory negligence (by whatever name it may be known) as
a bar to recovery under either the theory of product liability or
implied warranty. 2s
One of the most delightful cases where the defense of contributory
negligence was denied occurred in California. The plaintiff, while read-
ing a newspaper, began to eat a chocolate bar. After consuming ap-
proximately one-third of it, "she bit into a mushy worm,",, and suf-
fered injuries which resulted in her being awarded damages.
A typical case involving a flammable garment is Nave v.
Hixenbaugh.30 The plaintiff, a business invitee, went into a filling sta-
tion to warm herself in front of a stove. Because the stove was defective,
the plaintiff's corduroy skirt caught fire. It was held that under the
circumstances the plaintiff was not contributorially negligent, so she
recovered for her injuries.
Many ladies have had their skirts catch fire,3 but the most famous
case is where the plaintiff's hula skirt was ignited from a glowing
cigarette butt on the floor.3 She borrowed the skirt from one who had
purchased it from a shop owned by the defendants. She wore the skirt
to a masquerade party in British Columbia. As a result of the fire the
plaintiff suffered burns over 75 percent of her body. The issue was
whether or not the plaintiff could recover without being in privity with
28. Texsun Feedyards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 311 F. Supp. 644, 647 (N.D.
Tex. 1970).
29. Kassouf v. Lee Bros. Inc., 209 Cal. App.2d 568, - 26 Cal. Rptr. 276, 277
(1962).
30. 180 Kan. 370, 304 P.2d 482 (1956).
3 1 See cases and text at notes 8 and 9, supra.
32. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), afj'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 23
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 5 [1971], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss5/5
NOTES
the seller. The court in divining the Hawaii law decided the plaintiff
need not be in privity. It also denied the defense of contributory negli-
gence.
[T]he court holds that contributory negligence, under the generally
accepted rule is not a bar to a suit based on implied warranty...
IT]he doctrine of contributory negligence, which takes no account
of the comparative negligence of the parties, often produces results
far from equitable. ..
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals further supported the District
Court's position by stating:
Anticipating that one may, negligently, drop tobacco ash upon
one's clothing, one may well rely upon a warranty that such clo-
thing is made from suitable fabric which does not possess extraor-
dinary characteristics of flammability and, accordingly, which
will not burst into flame as the result of such an act of careless-
ness.Y
These decisions, which are annotated," indicate that the trend is away
from allowing contributory negligence as a defense.
C. Contributory Negligence-A Defense to an Implied Warranty
The courts which have allowed this defense to an implied warranty
action usually were faced with facts which were overwhelmingly against
the plaintiff. Consider Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
3 16
Here the plaintiff, after having good reason to know the beverage was
adulterated with broken glass, continued to quench her insatisable
thirst. Such action by the plaintiff allowed the defendant bottler to
successfully employ the defense of contributory negligence.
A retail clothing store was also able to employ this defense in a
pre-Code negligence action.3 7 The plaintiff had purchased a "fuzzy
wuzzy" bathrobe. She was smoking and wearing the robe over a gown.
When she noticed smoke, she made little attempt to extinguish the fire,
but finally arose, strolled into the bathroom and removed the burning
33. 198 F. Supp. at 86.
34. 304 F.2d at 153.
35. Annot., 4 A.L.R. 3d 490 (1965).
36. 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963).
37. Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.W.2d 217
(1945).
1971]
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robe which had only scorched her gown. The court in taking cognizance
of the plaintiffs lethargic actions also noted that the seller needn't give
warning to prospective purchasers because "[p]ersons of ordinary in-
telligence also know that openly woven fluffy and 'fuzzy wuzzy' mate-
rials will ignite and burn more readily than ordinary cloth."3
Later decisions have, on occasion, allowed the defendant to em-
ploy the defense of contributory negligence to an implied warranty
action. In Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,3" the court noted that
"[t]he weight of authority. . . appears to be that contributory negli-
gence on the part of the buyer of a product sold under a warranty of
fitness is not a defense in an action against the manufacturer or seller
of the product for breach of that warranty."40 Nevertheless, the court
found for the defendant. The plaintiff was severely burned when the
head of a match she was using to light a cigarette ignited her 100
percent cotton nightgown while she was lying in bed. She had taken a
"heavy dosage"'" of a "rapidly acting barbiturate"4 a few moments
prior to lying down flat and lighting the cigarette. In this case, as well
as those previously mentioned within this subsection, the plaintiff
clearly was at fault. However, the decisions appear to be uniform in
holding for the plaintiff where there is no clear-cut evidence that the
plaintiff was negligent.43
D. Strict Liability
Strict liability evolved from the action for breach of warranty,
. . . but shorn of the verbiage and complications of warranty law;
strict liability reduces the difficulty of injured victims in proving
negligence of sellers of products and shifts the risk of loss for
defective products from the ultimate user to those who put such
products on the market. Strict liability is a vehicle of social pol-
icy.44
Indeed, strict liability is a relatively new concept in the law, but
38. Id. at 359, 186 S.W.2d at 220.
39. 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962).
40. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 345.
42. Id. at 344.
43. For an excellent discussion of products liability and its defenses, see Epstein,
Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiffs Conduct, UTAfi L. REV. 267 (1968).
44. LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 375-76 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
[Vol. 23
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since the American Law Institute promulgated the concept in 1965,11
several jurisdictions have seen fit to adopt it.
Pennsylvania adopted § 402A in 196646 when the plaintiff was
injured by an exploding beer keg which was purchased from the defen-
dant. Subsequently, the Federal District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania deftly applied it in LaGorga v. Kroger Co.47 The minor
plaintiff was playing near a metal barrel in which refuse was burning.
He was wearing a jacket with an outer cotton shell and an interlining
composed of mill waste which was comprised of 50 percent unknown
material and 50 percent acrylic fiber. A spark landed on the jacket and
burned a nickel-sized hole. One of his friends tried to extinguish the
fabric but could not. He also tried to take the jacket off but the zipper
jammed. In panic, the child ran. Testimony proved that flames several
feet long shot out from the child's body. He was tackled and rolled in
blankets, but the material persisted in burning.48 Finally the fabrics
were extinguished leaving the child with burns over 80 percent of his
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)-Special Liability of Seller
of Product for Physicial Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
46. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
47. 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
48. LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. at 378.
"It was stipulated by all parties that the jacket conformed to or was not
in violation of the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1191
et seq., which stipulation was some evidence that the design was not unrea-
sonably dangerous. See: Commentary on Flammable Fabrics Act by
Maurine B. Neuberger, Consumer Consultant, Department of Labor,
Trial, April-May 1967, p. 44."
See also, text at note 62, infra.
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body. In rendering judgment for the minor plaintiff under the theory
of strict liability, the court said:
To an ever-increasing extent in this day of synthetic living, the
population is dependent on mass producers for its wearing ap-
parel. The composition and qualities of combined fabrics are not
generally known. Greater care and integrity is required by society
from sellers, as well as increased caution for the safety and well-
being of all users, especially the child consumer. Where experi-
ment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the
degree of unusual danger in a child's jacket, the product should
not be tried out on those who wear it. The public cannot be ex-
pected to possess the facilities or technical knowledge to appre-
hend inherent or latent dangers. The decisive factor is the condi-
tion of the product which a jury might find to be defective and
unreasonably dangerous in foreseeable circumstances. Sellers do
have duties to the public. They have no greater right to place on
the market a product which may foreseeably cause harm than does
a drunken driver to operate an automobile."
Additional advantages of strict liability are that the theory is one
of pure tort and not of negligence. Furthermore, it does not have the
theoretical difficulties which are inherent in a contractural express or
implied warranty.A0 Contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict
liability claim; however, assumption of the risk is.'
The South Carolina Supreme Court has considered adopting
§ 402A, but as yet it has not been presented with a factual situation
where it could readily be applied. The plaintiff in Springfield v. Wil-
liams Plumbing Supply Co.52 brought an action against the defendant
for damages caused by a water heater which exploded. The court or-
dered a trial on the merits because it did not want to decide such
important points as strict liability or pre-Code implied warranty on a
demurrer.
It is interesting to note that in a subsequent federal court case,
based on Springfield and the action taken by the South Carolina Legis-
lature in adopting a very liberal implied warranty provision, 3 United
States District Judge Martin divined the South Carolina law to include
49. Id. at 379.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
51. Id., comment n.
52. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-318 (1966).
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strict liability.5 The South Carolina plaintiff alleged three causes of
action: (1) negligence, (2) breach of warranty, and (3) strict liability.
The defendants contended, inter a!ia, that South Carolina did not rec-
ognize strict liability in tort. In citing Springfield, the court said "that
if and when the question is properly presented on appeal to the South
Carolina Supreme Court, it would most likely follow the direction of
the modern trend of authority in products liability cases by adopting
the strict liability rule set forth in Restatement of Torts (2d), Sec.
402A."' s The court found itself confronted with the same type of prob-
lem that faced the United States District Court for the District of
Vermont." The District Judge, after careful consideration of Vermont
law and in particular 9A V.S.A. § 2-318, 57 concluded that strict liabil-
ity applied in Vermont.
Strict liability is an extremely strong legal weapon, but in our
corporate-industrial economy, the older theories of recovery are often
prohibitively difficult and expensive for the plaintiff to utilize. Industry
should take warning and institute quality control programs so their
goods are safe. If they cannot make them safe, they must warn the
consumer.1s If they fail to warn the consumer of unsafe conditions or
goods, then they should suffer the consequences.
E. Third and Fourth Party Liability
Although most flammable fabric suits are directed at the seller,
there are often numerous possible defendants. Whereas many commod-
ities are manufactured by only one company, textiles go through many
different manufacturing operations. First, there is the fiber producer,
either the farmer or a synthetic yarn manufacturer. Then comes the
spinner, followed by the weaver whose product is known as a greige
good. These goods then go to dyers and finishers and on to converters
and cut-and-sew plants. Once the material is made into a garmet, it will
go to various wholesalers, jobbers, and/or retailers. This chain is ex-
tremely flexible and varies for different textile goods, but it should be
clear that the sued textile seller usually attempts to join these processors
54. Starnes v. Keller Industries, Inc., Civil No. 70-204 (D.S.C., filed June 10, 1970).
55. Id. at 3.
56. Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970).
57. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-318 (Supp. 1966) for similar statutory treatment.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Commentj (1965).
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as co-defendants. Usually, the number of defendants is limited because
it is virtually impossible to prove that a particular defendant made the
cloth or grew the cotton. Such was the case in LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,"
where the defendant was unable to prove that the third-party defendant
had made the jacket."0 The defendant's failure also released Lowenstein
& Sons as a fourth party defendant (the third-party defendant's manu-
facturer).
Third and fourth party defendant fights are by no means uncom-
mon, especially where the plaintiff has settled with the primary defen-
dant for injuries caused by a garmet fire.0"
IV. LEGISLATION CONCERNING FLAMMABLE FABRICS
A. United States
The United States Congress modified the Flammable Fabrics
Act6" in 1967, but despite excellent intentions, 3 the Act does not prevent
59. 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967). See text at note 44, supra.
60. Cf. Timberlake v. M.A. Henry Co., 104 N.Y.S.2d 284, affd, 103 N.Y.S.2d 452
(1951).
61. See, e.g., McDonald v. Blue Jeans Corp., 183 F. Supp. 149 (S.D. N.Y. 1960)
(Fringe on cowboy suit).
62. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1191, et seq. (1967) amending 15 U.S.C.A. § 1191, et seq.
(1953).
63. H.R. RFP. No. 972, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 617,passim (1967).
"This legislation would protect the public against risk of fire leading to
death, injury, or property damage arising out of ignition of articles of
wearing apparel and interior household furnishings. It would also make the
Flammable Fabrics Act more flexible by permitting flammability stan-
dards and other regulations to be issued under rulemaking procedures
rather than having them fixed by law as is now the case. The need for such
standards and regulations would be based on a continuing study and inves-
tigation and research provided for in the bill which would be carried out
by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Secretary of
Commerce...
"Although precise statistics are lacking, the available evidence makes
it abundantly clear that the toll in terms of death, injury, and disfigurement
from fires involving wearing apparel and interior furnishings is far greater
than need be. For example Public Health Service estimates that at least
150,000 persons annually are burned seriously enough to receive a doctor's
care, or to restrict their activities for at least a day as a result of ignition
of clothing alone. Unfortunately, the victims of burns, particularly of
clothings fire burns, are very largely concentrated among the very young
and the aged. The former often have not learned the significance of what
[Vol. 23
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NOTES
flammable clothing from being marketed. It merely establishes a few
standards and it only provides for government 4 and not private en-
forcement.
Consider how ineffectual the Act was in LaGorgl 5 where a child
sustained burns over 80 percent of his body-yet it was stipulated by
the parties that the Act's provisions had been met! The New York
courts also have recognized the uselessness of the Act as it now stands.
In Sherman v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc.," the plaintiff's pajamas
caught fire while she was in close proximity to a gas range. The court,
in ordering a new trial, rejected Lowenstein's argument that it could
not "be held liable because, in manufacturing the fabrics used in mak-
ing the pajamas, it complied with the flammability-testing method
prescribed by [The Flammable Fabrics Act]. While a defendant's com-
pliance with a statute 'is some evidence of the exercise of due care,'
[Citations omitted.] it does not preclude a conclusion that he was
negligent . . ." Such judicial language should awaken our legislators.
But until they do respond adequately, the Federal Trade Commission
can only prescribe rules and regulations and prohibit shipment or im-
portation of products in violation of the Act.61 Those who violate the
is happening to them; the later often suffer from disabilities and cannot
protect themselves rapidly enough. Many of these individuals suffer
months of pain, require extensive and expensive medical care, and incur
permanent physical disfiguration. Burns are therefore among the most
serious of human injuries in terms of long-term effects and costs.
"For these reasons the committee proposed amendments to the act
which would permit increased safeguards in the form of flammability
standards and regulations to better protect the public against unreasonable
risks of fire due to the flammability of wearing apparel and interior fur-
nishings. The legislation would also authorize the Secretary of Commerce
to continually update flammability standards to keep pace with new tech-
nological processes developed by industry."
64. Act of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. 90-189, §§ 3-5, 81 Stat. 569-71, amending 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1193-95 (1953) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1193-95 (1967)).
65. See note 48, supra.
66. 28 A.D.2d 922, 282 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1967).
67. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1194 (1967). 15 CFR 7 (1971) contains Flammable Fabrics Act
Procedures, 16 CFR 302 (1971) contains the Federal Trade Commission Rules and
Regulations under the Flammable Fabrics Act.
The ASTM (American Society for Testing Materials) Standards (D1230-61, Part
24, Oct. 1969, p. 253) which are a commercial offshoot of the government standards
indicate that "no guarantee can be given and none is implied that a fabric or product
[which meets these standards] will or will not burn with disasterous results under some
1971]
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rules and regulations are maily subject to a Federal Trade Commission
cease and desist order. 6s
Much public pressure is being exerted upon the legislative bodies
to enact preventive legislation. Various estimates have been made that
if the law required: (i) flame retardant chemicals on clothing, (2) con-
trol of the misuse of flammable liquids, and (3) fireguards for open
heaters, between 50 and 75 percent of all tragic and needless burn
injuries could be eliminated. 9
Our legislators are beginning to respond to these pressures. An
excellent example is the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969,11
but this Act does not include wearing apparel. Many other Bills are in
both houses of Congress, but most of them specifically exclude flamm-
able fabrics. 71 Hopefully effective legislation will soon be forthcoming.
condition of use." Id. at 255.
S. 3765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), entitled the Flammable Fabrics Act Amend-
ments, would greatly improve the Flammable Fabrics Act as it currently stands. See S.
REP. No. 1093, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The amendments would require the manu-
facturer to certify that a fabric offered for sale meets a certain regulation or standard.
The testing would be conducted by the manufacturers and approved by the Federal Trade
Commission. Failure to follow this mandate would be considered as unfair competition
and a deceptive act in commerce under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Enforcement provisions would also be strengthened in that a knowing violator
would be guilty of a felony subject to a $10,000 fine or 3 years imprisonment, or both.
One who violates the act without knowledge would be guilty of a misdemeanor and
subject to a $1,000 fine or I year in prison, or both. Lastly, the bill imposes civil penalties
not to exceed $10,000 for each violation. One bad provision in the opinion of the author,
is that the civil and criminal penalties in the bill are cumulative. To the best knowledge
of the author, this bill (S.3765) had not been enacted as of June 1, 1971. However, during
the week of July 26, 1971, the Commerce Department overrode the objections of manu-
facturers, and said that beginning in July 1973, it will ban the sale of children's slecpwcar
that has not been flameproofed. TINIa, Aug. 9, 1971, at 60. Apparently, the dyke is
beginning to leak.
68. See, In the Matter of. Watumull Bros., Ltd., 66 F.T.C. 1323 (1964), where the
defendant was ordered to stop importing flammable saris. Cf., In the Matter of: New
York Sankyo Seiko Co., 64 F.T.C. 342 (1964) and In the Matter of. The Schwarzenbach
Huber Co., 64 F.T.C. 345 (1964).
69. Unpublished material supplied-courtesy of the Shriners Burns Institute, Galves-
ton, Texas.
70. Pub. L. 91-113, Nov. 6, 1969, 83 Stat. 187, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 401n, 1261, 1262,
1274 (Supp. 1969).
71. E.g., S. 4054,91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 33b (1970). See note 67, supra.
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B. England
The English experienced a burn epidemic in the early part of the
1950's. Statistical studies indicated that most of the fires were caused
by flammable nightclothing and defectively designed open space heat-
ers. Parliament, taking cognizance of these statistics, responded with
The Heating Appliances (Fireguards) Act of 195272 and The Consumer
Protection Act of 1961. 73 They have also promulgated Oil Heaters
Regulations74 and Children's Nightdress Regulations. 75 According to
later statistical studies, the death rate has decreased by approximately
50 percent since the passage of the aforementioned legislation .7
V. CONCLUSION
Having become familiar with the law of flammable fabrics, one
cannot help but draw a parallel between the plight of the American
consumer and Harry Graham's Billy.7 7 Our concern is for the victim,
not the potential victim. We react in the courts, rather than act in the
legislature.
Until legislation is enacted, our only redress is in the courts. But
until the time of legislative protection, remember that all of the plain-
tiffs written about were at one time potential victims. You and I are
potential victims. Will our status change?
DAVID D. ARMSTRONG
72. 15& 16 Geo. 6& I Eliz. 2, c. 42.
73. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 40, s.6.
74. S.I. (Statutory Instrument) 1962 No. 884; 1965 No. 588.
75. S.I. 1964 No. 1153. See also Heating Appliances (Fireguards) (Scotland) Regu-
lations (S.I. 1953 No. 524); Heating Appliances (Fireguards) Regulations (S.I. 1953 No.
526); and Stands for Carry-cots (Safety) Regulations (S.I. 1966 No. 610).
76. See note 69, supra.
77. Billy, in one of his nice new sashes,
Fell in the fire and was burnt to ashes;
Now, although the room grows chilly,
I haven't the heart to poke poor Billy.
Harry Graham (1874-1936)
From: Ruthless Rhymes for Heartless Homes [1899]
Tenderness
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